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ABSTRACT 
Sleep-related fatigue has negative effects on both human performance and 
decision making.  Pilots are particularly vulnerable to these adverse effects due to the 
environment and operational requirements, which entails both long and irregular duty 
cycles.   
The Air National Guard received funding from Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Defense Safety Oversight Council to create FlyAwake, a software application 
that predicts aircrew fatigue based on circadian cycles.  FlyAwake uses the Sleep, 
Activity, Fatigue, and Task Effectiveness (SAFTE) Model and calculates predicted 
effectiveness.  Recently, contract modifications have permitted integration with U.S. 
Navy’s Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (SHARP) as an Operational Risk 
Management (ORM) tool.  Naval Aviation does not currently use fatigue modeling as 
part of operational flight scheduling, and it is the intent of this thesis to provide a proof of 
concept analysis of FlyAwake for Commander, Navy Air Forces (CNAF). 
In order to validate FlyAwake, flight schedules from February 2008 were 
collected from the Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron Light Four Two (HSL-42) 
SHARP database.  A statistical analysis compared fatigue levels of aircrew using 
conventional scheduling methods against those with fatigue modeling, and showed 
improved fatigue-based performance effectiveness with the utilization of FlyAwake. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Naval Aviation has established strict scheduling guidelines aimed at mitigating 
aircrew fatigue and enhancing performance effectiveness.  These governing publications 
mandate maximum and minimum lengths for crew day and crew rest, respectively, but 
fatigue is still a primary cause in aviation mishaps.  Currently, aircrew fatigue 
information is not provided to the squadron operations and safety departments based on 
personal circadian cycles.  Aircrew fatigue levels, referred to as “predicted effectiveness” 
in fatigue modeling, can be calculated based upon 72 hours of sleep history and recent 
flight schedules and provided to the scheduling decision makers.  This information can be 
utilized to create safer flight schedules by optimizing crew compositions based on 
predicted effectiveness.  
Aviation specific fatigue modeling is currently available through FlyAwake, 
which is a software application designed to implement the Department of Defense (DoD) 
approved Safety, Activity, Fatigue, and Task Effectiveness (SAFTE) Model.  The 
FlyAwake application was designed by MarcoSystems under guidance from the 201st Air 
National Guard (ANG) and funded from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC).  A contract modification was made in spring 
of 2009 to include the United States Navy’s (USN) aviation database, Sierra Hotel 
Aviation Readiness Program (SHARP) created by Innova Systems, as a recipient for 
software integration.  Currently, integration efforts are underway between the two 
software companies to make a seamless integration of SHARP and FlyAwake.  Once this 
is accomplished, the USN’s Commander, Navy Air Forces (CNAF) will select candidate 
fleet squadrons to provide usability feedback. 
The original intent of this thesis was to explore the utility of combining SHARP 
with FlyAwake.  However, the software release of FlyAwake v2.0 and subsequent 
integration with SHARP were delayed, making this impossible given time constraints.  
Instead, we conducted a proof of concept (POC) analysis.  Using a retrospective analysis 
of actual U.S. Naval Aviation missions and flight schedules, this thesis determined if the 
 xviii
FlyAwake algorithm identified aircrew at high risk of fatigue.  Helicopter Antisubmarine 
Squadron Light Four Two (HSL-42) flight scheduling data were obtained through the 
SHARP database.  The month of February 2008 was selected for the period of analysis in 
order to capture a time period within the year with typical operations tempo 
(OPTEMPO).  Special scheduling requests (“snivels”), ground events, qualifications 
reports, currency reports, logbooks, and completed flight schedules were extracted from 
SHARP and focused on two distinct detachments for this research.   
The focus on detachments was deliberate and intended to spotlight unique 
characteristics of Naval Aviation.  Once an aviation detachment embarks on a warship, 
they are limited to their embarked crew resources.  This scenario is an accurate example 
of how naval squadrons and detachments conduct flight operations while deployed.  
Historically, HSL detachments deploy with one or two helicopters and are limited to five 
or six pilots.  Knowing this, we designed the POC to reflect these realistic restrictions 
which bound this thesis analysis. 
Historical flight schedules were submitted to FlyAwake to calculate predicted 
effectiveness of individual pilots.  The FlyAwake algorithm was able to identify specific 
occurrences in which pilots’ predicted effectiveness levels dropped below a critical 
threshold (77.5%) level.  Only those occurrences below this threshold were considered 
candidates for potential flight schedule changes.  Additionally, schedule changes were 
limited only to alterations in crew composition (i.e., switching pilots) rather than 
rescheduling mission times.  This restriction from changing assigned flight times 
reflected the limited ability that detachment operations officers have when scheduling 
actual flight operations. 
Those identified and feasible changes were made to historical flight schedules 
during instances in which FlyAwake identified a pilot dropping below the critical 
threshold during any portion of the flight profile (i.e., preflight, in-flight, post-flight).  
The altered flight schedules were re-submitted to FlyAwake and the results were 
collected and compared as measures of effectiveness (MOE).  The MOEs of this 
retrospective analysis assessed whether predicted effectiveness improved after applying 
FlyAwake and modifying the flight schedules that were identified as high risk.  
 xix
Maximum, minimum, and range of predicted effectiveness of each detachment were 
calculated and we found that these values remained fairly constant after executing 
schedule changes based on FlyAwake results.  However, categorical data analysis 
revealed the added value of the FlyAwake fatigue modeling.  One detachment 
experienced a 16.7% reduction of post-flight occurrences below the critical threshold, 
while the other showed a 25.0% reduction of in-flight occurrences coupled with a 12.5% 
reduction of post-flight occurrences below the critical threshold.  Additionally, all 
occurrences observed in this study in the high-risk category occurred at night, which 
highlighted another current flight scheduling weakness regarding fatigue modeling (i.e., 
fatigue risk management). 
In summary, this research provides a statistically valid proof of concept for the 
FlyAwake integration into SHARP by demonstrating the software’s capability of 
identifying aircrew susceptible to fatigue during naval flight operations.  This study does 
not recommend any Naval Aviation policy changes, but advocates the consideration of 
FlyAwake fatigue feedback when Operations Departments create flight schedules.  
Recommendations included assigning a permanent program manager to oversee and 
coordinate future developments for integration and usability study suggestions. 
 
 xx
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xxi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First, I would like to thank Dr. Nita L. Miller and Professor Matthew G. Boensel 
for their extensive efforts with this thesis.  Without their guidance, I would not have been 
able to complete this research. 
I would also like to extend personal thanks and professional gratitude to LT 
Matthew Williams, Greg Everett, Captain Lynn Lee, Stefan LaMotte, and Robert 
Carlson.  Their assistance was paramount in matters ranging from the data collection to 
software integration. 
Finally and most importantly, I could not have accomplished this work without 
the support of my beautiful wife, Amanda.  Thank you for keeping me both focused and 
relaxed.  I appreciate you extending me the patience and time necessary to complete this 
project.  
 xxii




A. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW 
Fatigue was identified by the Naval Safety Center (NSC) as a cited cause of over 
24% of mishaps in Naval Aviation from 1997–2002 (Davenport, 2005).  Historical 
statistics such as these have been a driving factor for almost 30 years worth of research 
and development focused on fatigue management in the Department of Defense.  These 
efforts have resulted in many advancements in the understanding of human fatigue and 
the development of fatigue management models and software.  However, fatigue persists 
as a major contributor to mishaps in Naval Aviation. 
Naval Aviation has published instructions that establish specific guidelines for 
crew day and crew rest requirements for Naval Aviators, Naval Flight Officers, and 
Naval Aircrewmen.  These requirements have been implemented into the flight 
scheduling processes of all U.S. Navy squadron Operations and Safety Departments.  
Additionally, they are included as a guideline for flight schedule validation within the 
U.S. Navy’s Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (SHARP) scheduling software.   
However, are these requirements sufficient to manage fatigue in the operational aviation 
environment?  Can the implementation of fatigue assessment software within SHARP 
result in safer flight scheduling? The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a systematic 
assessment of the advantages of utilizing the newly developed fatigue management 
software, FlyAwake, in the Navy flight scheduling and ORM processes. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) has been heavily involved in 
research and development of fatigue assessment and mitigation models, and software for 
over 30 years.  It has funded research in both military and civilian sectors to conduct 
studies that led to enhanced fatigue awareness and mitigation.  While much of this 
research has resulted in broader awareness and safety regulations, there continues to be a 
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void in the incorporation of these advancements into user-friendly software that is 
capable of being easily integrated into current flight scheduling processes.  However, 
recently, this void may have been filled by the development of a program called 
FlyAwake. 
In 2007, the U.S. Air National Guard (ANG) was awarded funding through the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Defense Safety Oversight Counsel (DSOC) to 
contract with MacroSystems, a small business based in Seattle, to develop a new fatigue-
assessment software application with a focus on usability:  FlyAwake.  This software 
package is web-based and has a graphical user interface (GUI) that was designed on 
principles of simplicity and efficiency.  FlyAwake applies the already validated and DoD 
accepted Sleep, Activity, Fatigue, and Task Effectiveness (SAFTE) Model in a method 
that compliments current aviation databases and flight scheduling software (Capt Lynn 
Lee, personal communication, April 9, 2009).   
FlyAwake was successfully incorporated into the flight scheduling process of 
ANG 201st Airlift Squadron stationed in Maryland.  The ANG 201st used it as a safety 
validation method of proposed flight schedules, and saw direct effects of reduced aircrew 
fatigue levels and increased morale.  As a result, DSOC funded a second revision of 
FlyAwake in 2008.  In this current contract, funding is available for integrating the 
FlyAwake software into military aviation flight scheduling software.  The U.S. Air Force 
Patriot Excalibur (PEX) is one the military software programs benefitting from this 
contract, and there is also an opportunity to integrate FlyAwake into the U.S. Navy’s 
SHARP scheduling software. 
C. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis is a comparative analysis of Naval Aviation fatigue management tools 
involved in U.S. Navy squadron flight scheduling.  The current methods of flight 
scheduling are compared against flight scheduling using FlyAwake, a newly available 
software application.  DSOC funding covers contract support for MacroSystems to 
integrate FlyAwake into the U.S. Navy’s aviation scheduling database, SHARP.  The 
 3
intent of this study is to determine the benefit of integrating this software into the Navy’s 
flight scheduling process.  The study analyzes whether the use of FlyAwake could 
potentially enhance safety in naval aviation by avoiding crew fatigue through more 
appropriate scheduling of the aircrew. 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The military flight scheduling process is complicated and detailed, subject to 
many constraining factors.  Schedules are generally drafted on multiple time scales, 
ranging from yearly to hourly intervals.  This study focuses on the generation of daily and 
weekly flight schedules.  A typical Navy squadron will draft a weekly flight schedule that 
is based on operations, training, and maintenance requirements and is subject to aircraft 
availability.  The combination of these factors results in a dynamically changing schedule 
that is not usually finalized until just prior to execution.  These dynamics are not captured 
in this study (i.e., logged flight times were not altered in the study).  Instead, this study 
uses historical data from an actual squadron to analyze flight schedules over a time period 
representing an average operations tempo, comparing the two scheduling methods to 
determine if there are differences in the predicted effectiveness of aircrew using the two 
scheduling methods (i.e., with and without FlyAwake).    
There is one other dynamic of the flight scheduling process this study does not 
consider.  This study does not analyze the human computer integration (HCI) portion of 
software implementation with SHARP in a U.S. Navy squadron.  This would require 
Command compliance and endorsement, and is beyond the scope of the current effort.  
However, FlyAwake usability tests have been conducted by the ANG in their flight 
scheduling process.  These tests found the software to be user-friendly and the squadron 
experienced a decrease in fatigue related mishaps following its incorporation into their 
scheduling process.  Due to the similarity in the flight scheduling processes, this study 
makes the assumption that the ANG HCI analysis is adequate for U.S. Navy purposes as 
well. 
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The final assumption in the comparative analysis pertains to the extent of 
deviation permitted after historical flight schedules are analyzed by FlyAwake.  
FlyAwake predicts when a crewmember will be below a certain threshold of predicted 
effectiveness.  However, a squadron operations department always retains the ability to 
override any recommendations offered by the software.  In this analysis, 77.5% predicted 
effectiveness was used as the indicator for considering alternative scheduling options.  
For the purposes of simulating the restrictive nature of scheduling flight operations while 
embarked on U.S. Navy warships, no alterations to takeoff or landing times were 
permitted.  Realizing that these times are often rigid, the analysis only considers changes 
to crew assignments.  The assumption that the scheduled flight times could not be altered 
focused the study on the aircrew vice the continuous nature of naval flight operations. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I introduces the study by describing the background of fatigue assessment 
software, the objective, limitations, and assumptions of the study.  Chapter II contains a 
review of literature that covers sleep, fatigue, aviation rest regulations, and aviation 
operational risk management for the different military services and a chronological 
history of fatigue assessment models and software developed through the Department of 
Defense (DoD).  Chapter III explains the methods used in this thesis, while Chapter IV 
contains the results of this study.  Chapter V concludes the study with a discussion of 










II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to provide scientific background to 
illustrate the dynamics and driving factors present in fatigue modeling.  This discussion 
begins by focusing on sleep and the factors that affect its quality, the distinct phases of 
sleep, and effects of sleep deprivation on human performance.  The focus then transitions 
to the effects of fatigue on performance and current measures employed to counter its 
negative effects.  Current regulations governing aviation work cycles and rest 
requirements are discussed in addition to the risk matrices developed to mitigate fatigue-
related risk.  The ultimate objective of this literature review is to introduce and explain 
the terms and concepts that researchers and developers have incorporated into the fatigue 
assessment models and software that are introduced in Chapter III.  
A. SLEEP 
Sleep is one of several factors that can contribute to fatigue and performance 
degradation in aviation.  It is arguably one of the most important factors in safe and 
sustained operations, and generally one that can be managed through proper planning.  
Research studies have shown that sleep has direct effects on overall health (National 
Sleep Foundation, 2009).  It is a basic physiological human need that is essential for 
maintaining a strong immune and endocrine system, along with stabilizing moods, 
increasing memory, and maintaining cognitive performance levels (National Sleep 
Foundation, 2009).  While sleep requirements vary from 6 to 10 hours per day between 
different individuals, optimal performance and alertness is achieved with an average of 8 
to 8.25 hours of daily sleep (Neri, Dinges, & Rosekind, 1997).  Thus, a daily sleep cycle 
is formed that includes 8 hours of sleep and 16 hours of wakefulness. 
A scientific understanding of different sleep factors such as sleep reservoir, 




manage daily schedules to reduce the risk of fatigue by providing conditions for quality 
sleep.  The following sections will discuss these sleep factors and their affects of human 
performance. 
1. Sleep Reservoir 
Sleep reservoir is defined as a sleep-dependent process that governs the human 
capacity to perform cognitive work (Hursh et al., 2003).  It is further described as either 
the replenishment (sleep accumulation) or depletion (sleep debt) of sleep that an 
individual obtains.  Sleep accumulation is governed by both the quality and intensity of 
sleep while sleep debt refers to the current level of an individual’s sleep reservoir.  
Anytime a person is awake, their sleep reservoir is considered to be in a state of 
depletion.  Conversely, as an individual enters sleep, they begin to replenish the depleted 
sleep reservoir.  The rate at which this cycle of accumulation and depletion occurs 
depends on various environmental, circadian, and operational factors. 
Sleep debt can be further described as either acute sleep loss or chronic 
cumulative sleep loss.  Both circumstances refer to the condition where an individual 
obtains less than their required amount of sleep within a given 24 hour time period.  
Acute sleep loss occurs when a person misses or gets an abbreviated period of sleep.  
This form of sleep debt can be alleviated by obtaining a greater amount of sleep or an 
increased quality of sleep during the following sleep period (Lambert, 2005).  Acute 
sleep loss is generally associated with a decreased ability to perform tasks and feelings of 
fatigue.  Cumulative sleep loss encompasses chronic sleep loss over a greater range of 
time.  The period of cumulative sleep loss can range from days and weeks to years.  
During these longer periods, smaller amounts of sleep deprivation exist than usually seen 
in an acute sleep loss scenario.  However, this does not necessarily translate into the 
negative effects also being smaller.  The effects of cumulative sleep loss may take longer 
to present, but also takes longer for recovery (Hursh et al., 2003). 
Research has shown that cumulative sleep loss may result in degraded human 
performance including decreased abilities in decision-making skills, attention spans, 
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short-term memory retention, and problem-solving (Chapman, 2001).  Another impact of 
sleep deprivation is an absence or reduction in the ability of an individual to assess their 
personal fatigue level.  A study by Van Dongen et al. (2003) showed that individuals 
overestimated their personal level of alertness when subject to chronic sleep deprivation.  
This inability to assess one's state of restfulness can be especially dangerous to aviation 
operators.  In addition to these examples of performance degrading effects, chronic sleep 
debt has also been linked to high blood pressure, obesity, and diabetes (Van Dongen, 
Rogers, & Dinges, 2003). 
2. Circadian and Homeostasis Factors 
The sleep/wake homeostasis and circadian biological clock are the two internally 
regulating factors in the human body (National Sleep Foundation, 2009).  The sleep/wake 
homeostasis process, or restorative process, regulates the necessary sleep and 
wakefulness balance in the body.  It is the driving force that identifies the need for sleep 
and then controls the quantity of sleep needed to properly account for time spent awake.  
If this process were the only governing factor of sleep, an individual would wake up fully 
rested and deplete energy at a steady rate until going to sleep in the evening.  However, 
this is not the case.  The circadian biological clock, more commonly referred to as 
circadian rhythm, governs the actual timing of feelings of sleepiness and wakefulness 
throughout the day.  These feelings vary slightly between individuals, but the strongest 
sleep drives generally occur between 2:00am and 4:00am and again later with less 
intensity between 1:00pm and 3:00pm (National Sleep Foundation, 2009).  The 
magnitude of these circadian sleep drives is dependent on whether a person is rested or 
experiencing sleep deprivation.  A sleep-deprived individual will experience a more 
intense sleep drive during the periods noted than a rested person.  The circadian rhythm 




The circadian rhythm is controlled by cells in the brain called the suprachiasmatic 
nucleus (SCN) which responds to light and dark signals (National Sleep Foundation, 
2009).  When the human eye detects light, it sends signals to the SCN that indicate the 
start of a wakefulness period.  The SCN then distributes signals to other portions of the 
brain initiating the release of hormones such as cortisol, a rise in body temperature, and 
other functions that control feelings of wakefulness.  This signal from the SCN also 
results in the delay of the release of hormones such as melatonin, which is associated 
with sleepiness.  Melatonin, a naturally occurring hormone produced by the pineal gland, 
is released when the optic nerve receives no light signals; it promotes sleep and reverses 
the alerting process. 
Research shows that there is a biological drive for the human body to be awake 
during the day and asleep at night (National Sleep Foundation, 2009).  The sleep debt 
concept further explains the importance of sleep regularity.  Irregular sleep patterns are 
not only linked to increased fatigue and decreased performance effectiveness, but are also 
related to chronic illnesses.  This poses serious challenges for aviation flight scheduling.  
Proper consideration of sleep debt and circadian processes when creating flight schedules 
is a necessary practice for reducing the unnecessary risk of scheduling fatigued aviators 
for missions.  The current regulations regarding sleep with respect to aviation flight 
scheduling are discussed in Section C of this chapter. 
B. NAVAL AVIATION OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
Operational Risk Management (ORM) is defined in OPNAVINST 3710.7T as “a 
systematic, decision making process used to identify and manage hazards that endanger 
naval resources.”  It is a decision-making methodology that allows personnel to manage 
risk by employing this five-step process: 
 1.) Identify hazards 
 2.) Assess hazards 
 3.) Make risk decisions 
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 4.) Implement controls 
 5.) Supervise 
This process is further enhanced by providing four guiding principles that instruct 
decision makers to “accept risk when [the] benefits outweigh the costs, accept no 
unnecessary risk, anticipate and manage risk by planning, [and] make risk decisions at 
the right level.”  These principles provide a clear cut framework in which to employ the 
five-step ORM process.  The instruction recognizes that this process is dependent on time 
and asset availability, and provides three levels of implementation; time critical, 
deliberate, and in-depth.  A time critical situation requires a quick mental review of the 
ORM steps when conducting time essential mission changes that do not permit a full 
discussion.  A brief overview of the steps will allow the crew to recognize any risks 
involved and take mitigating action.  The deliberate level is one that does provide time 
for brainstorming in groups to use collective experience in order to identify hazards and 
mitigate risk.  Finally, an in-depth level is one that entails a high level of scrutiny that 
thoroughly studies hazards and risks in complex operations such as weapons 
detachments. 
The ORM process is not unique to Naval Aviation, but is practiced by the entire 
U.S. Navy and has been designed for warfighter applicability across all naval 
communities.  The general purpose of ORM is to allow warfighters to make informed 
risk decisions and increase operational readiness by using a combination of professional 
knowledge and experience to anticipate and mitigate risk.  The resulting effect decreases 
the potential for loss in combat and ultimately gives naval forces an advantage.  
Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) NATOPS model managers are further directed by 
OPNAVINST 3710.7T to enhance this baseline ORM process to address specific risk 
management concepts that may be unique to each individual Naval Aviation community. 
C. AVIATION CREW REST/CREW DAY REGULATIONS 
Fatigue has been identified as a causal factor in countless mishap investigations; 
as a result, both military and civilian regulatory authorities have imposed strict guidelines 
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defining requirements for aircrew rest and work cycles.  These terms are known within 
the aviation community as crew rest and crew day, respectively.  The guidelines in both 
sectors are similar and provide well defined timelines that specify the maximum number 
of flight hours that can be scheduled.  Mandated rest periods both before and after flight 
completion are always specified.  While these regulations have succeeded at 
standardizing rest requirements and duty cycles, they have failed to address many of the 
other contributing factors to fatigue such as circadian rhythms. 
This section will first specifically review the civil regulations regarding crew day 
and crew rest requirements of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and then 
proceed to military instructions of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Air 
Force. 
1. United States Federal Aviation Administration 
The Federal Aviation Administration is tasked with the responsibility for the 
advancement, safety, and regulation of civil aviation, developing new aviation 
technology, and other duties within the United States (FAA, 2006).  They are the primary 
oversight authority for regulating and enforcing crew rest for commercial aviation.  The 
FAA has accomplished this by creating a document entitled the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR).  The CFR contains four different sections pertaining to flight time 
regulations and crew rest requirements. 
CFR Part 91.1057 first establishes a baseline of definitions for the terms used 
within the document regarding duty and rest requirements.  The FAA considers pilot 
crew assignments as comprised of one pilot, two pilots, or an augmented flight crew, 
which is defined as “at least three pilots” (Government Printing Office [GPO] Access, 
2009).  Two other significant definitions are the duty period and rest period.  Duty period 
is defined as: 
The period of elapsed time between reporting for an assignment involving 
flight time and release from that assignment by the program manager. All 
time between these two points is part of the duty period, even if flight time 
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is interrupted by non flight-related duties. The time is calculated using 
either Coordinated Universal Time or local time to reflect the total elapsed 
time (GPO Access, 2009). 
Rest period is defined as: 
A period of time required pursuant to this subpart that is free of all 
responsibility for work or duty prior to the commencement of, or 
following completion of, a duty period, and during which the flight 
crewmember or flight attendant cannot be required to receive contact from 
the program manager. A rest period does not include any time during 
which the program manager imposes on a flight crewmember or flight 
attendant any duty or restraint, including any actual work or present 
responsibility for work should the occasion arise (GPO Access, 2009). 
The CFR Part 91.1059 focuses on flight time limitation and rest requirements for 
one or two pilot crews and CFR Part 91.1061 discusses the same limitation and 
requirements as applicable to augmented flight crews of fractional ownership operations.  
In these sections, guidelines are set forth to minimize crew fatigue by establishing flight 
time regulations.  For one or two pilot crews and augmented flight crews, no 
crewmember is permitted to exceed 500 flight hours in any calendar quarter, 800 hours in 
any two consecutive calendar quarters, or 1,400 hours in any calendar year.  Additionally, 
in any 24-hour period, no flight crew is permitted to be assigned a flight that exceeds 8 
hours for one pilot or 10 hours for two pilots.  Any pilot assigned to an augmented flight 
crew is limited to no more than 8 hours of flight deck duty accrual in any 24 consecutive 
hour time period.  The document also mandates sufficient pilot in command (PIC) and 
second in command (SIC) requirements to afford pilots in an augmented flight crew the 
ability to sleep (GPO Access, 2009). 
CFR Part 121.471 governs flight time limitations and rest requirements of all 
flight crewmembers conducting domestic operations.  This regulation is similar and 
applicable to military regulations and is the basis of comparison for this study.  This 
regulation focuses on all flight crewmembers, which is also how the military handles 
flight scheduling.  The FAA includes pilots and flight attendants under this categorical 
umbrella.  The following sections reviewing USN, USMC, and USAF aviation 
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regulations illustrate how the U.S. military includes pilots, flight officers, and 
aircrewmen under a similar category.  This regulation restricts any flight crewmember 
from exceeding 1,000 hours in any calendar year, 100 hours in any calendar month, and 
30 hours in any seven consecutive day time periods.  It further mandates that 
crewmembers have eight hours between required rest periods (GPO Access, 2009). 
The document goes into further detail by establishing different rest criteria within 
any 24 consecutive hour time period prior to the scheduling completion of a flight.  If the 
scheduled flight is less than eight hours in duration, the flight crewmember must be 
provided nine consecutive hours of rest.  For scheduled flights of eight or more hours, but 
less than nine hours, the crewmembers must be afforded ten consecutive hours of rest.  
Finally, any flight with a scheduled duration greater than nine hours requires eleven 
consecutive hours of rest.  The regulation includes a caveat that excludes certain 
circumstances that are beyond the control of the flight crewmembers (such as adverse 
weather conditions, unforeseen air traffic delays, or emergencies) (GPO Access, 2009). 
2. United States Navy and United States Marine Corps 
All personnel in the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps designated as either a 
Naval Aviator, Naval Flight Officer, or Naval Aircrewman are subject to regulations 
promulgated by OPNAVINST 3710.7T (2004), the Naval Air Training and Operating 
Procedures (NATOPS) specific to their Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) aircraft, and the 
specific Squadron Operating Procedures (SOP).  These documents are listed in order of 
increasing restriction; that is, each successive document is permitted to add regulations, 
but is never allowed to undermine regulations mandated in the parent document.  This 
allows a commanding officer (CO) of a squadron the ability to add a regulation in the 
SOP that pertains to his/her specific operating environment.  However, the CO cannot 
remove a regulation that has been directed by higher authority in either the aircraft 
NATOPS or OPNAVINST 3710.7T. 
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OPNAVINST 3710.7T Chapter 8.3.2.1 Rest and Sleep establishes basic 
guidelines to “attain and monitor personnel performance.”  The wording used in this 
document is very important in that it allows for deviation from the guidelines in cases 
where “operational necessity” dictates.  Operational necessity is officially defined as “a 
mission associated with war and peacetime operations in which the consequences of an 
action justify accepting the risk of loss of aircraft and crew.  The use of the word “shall” 
indicates mandatory compliance, the word “should” precedes a recommended procedure, 
“may” is used when a procedure is optional, while “will” indicates futurity and does not 
state any level of procedural requirement.  Understanding these key terms is essential to 
implementation of USN and USMC guidelines. 
Chapter 8.3.2.1 begins by stating guidelines for the work cycles of flight crew and 
flight support personnel.  It states that eight hours of sleep “should” be provided for every 
24 hour period with special consideration for collateral duties, watch standing, training, 
and off-duty activities.  The instruction further extends to the flight crew specifically by 
stating that sufficient time “should” be provided to eat and allow eight hours of 
uninterrupted rest.  The flight crew “should” not be scheduled to be on continuous alert 
status or flight duty over 18 hours.  If this restriction is violated for any reason, 
OPNAVINST 3710.7T mandates 15 continuous hours of off-duty time “shall” be 
provided to the flight crew. 
Flight time guidelines are provided to assist commanding officers with conducting 
flight operations.  The instruction refers to the impractical nature of mandating strict 
requirements due to the varying constraints associated with different aircraft 
communities.  It states that daily flight time “should” not normally exceed 6.5 hours or 
three flights for single-piloted aircraft and that individual flight time in other aircraft 
should not normally exceed 12 hours.  These numbers are based on the assumption that 
the average time from brief to debrief totals four hours.  Weekly maxima are 
recommended to not exceed 30 hours for single-piloted aircraft and 50 hours for others 
while neither “should” be assigned flight duties for more than six consecutive days.  The 
remaining guidelines are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Maximum Recommended Flight Time (OPNAVINST3710.7T, 2004) 
Each community within Naval Aviation must also comply with the NATOPS 
manual and SOP applicable to their specific T/M/S aircraft.  For the scope of this 
research, it is not necessary to review the guidelines of each manual.  However, a 
majority of communities observe a standard 12-hour crew day and 10 hour crew rest.  A 
crew day begins when a crewmember enters the squadron spaces and terminates after 
completion of the last military obligation.  Crew rest is considered the time after 
completion of the last military obligation until the next scheduled military obligation 
(e.g., duty, simulator, preflight briefing).  Additionally, the workday following watch 
standing disqualifies crewmembers from participating in the following day’s flight 
operations.  These rules are subject to operational requirements and deviation from the 
guidelines requires authorization by the CO.  The interpretation and implementation of 
these rules may vary between different commands, but remain similar in application. 
3. United States Air Force 
The U.S. Air Force crew rest and flight duty limitations are governed by the Air 
Force Instruction (AFI) 11-202, Volume 3, Chapter 9 (2006) which defines maximum 
flight duty periods (FDP) and crew rest requirements for all USAF aircrew.  The 
document is structured similar to the OPNAVINST in which it sets forth maximum and 
minimum requirements and delegates MAJCOM commanders to implement further 
restrictions at their discretion.  It allows commanders to account for specific fatiguing 
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effects such as extreme weather, mission requirements, jet lag, impaired crew rest, 
mission delays, and type of aircraft flown.  Chapter 9 also states that the T/M/S 
publications may have more restrictive requirements and therefore take precedence over 
the less restrictive standards.AFI 11-202 Volume 3 provides specific definitions for crew 
rest and flight duty limitation terminology.  It defines a crew rest period as, “the non-duty 
period before the flight duty period begins.  Its purpose is to allow the aircrew member 
the opportunity for adequate rest before performing in-flight duties.  “Crew rest is free 
time, which includes time for meals, transportation, and rest.”  (AFI 11-202V3.9.3.5, pg. 
69)  It further defines rest as “the condition which allows an individual the opportunity to 
sleep.” (AFI 11-202V3.9.3.5, pg. 69)  Crew rest is normally 12 hours prior to the FDP 
and requires at least eight hours of uninterrupted rest within the specific time period.  
Any official business that results in crew rest interruptions (including telephone calls) 
results in eight additional hours of uninterrupted rest with additional time provided to 
dress, eat, travel, etc. 
The AFI defines the Flight Duty Period as “a period that starts when an aircrew 
reports for a mission, briefing, or other official duty and ends when engines are shut 
down at the end of a mission, mission leg, or a series of missions.” (AFI 11-
202V3.9.3.6.1, pg. 69)  This definition is very similar to the Navy’s crew day and FAA’s 
duty period definitions and essential covers the same periods of duty.  The Air Force also 
details the maximum FDP based on the aircraft type; a descriptive chart is provided 
below with the published guidelines. 
Flight time regulations are established for all T/M/S aircraft on larger time scales.  
Total flight time is limited to 125 hours within any 30 consecutive day period and 330 
hours within any 90-day period.  The instruction has provided other scheduling 
restrictions that cover SCUBA diving, hypobaric chambers, blood donations, and alcohol 
consumption.  The final portion of the instruction includes waiver authority, which 
permits MAJCOM/DO (or ANG/XO) to extend the maximum FDP up to two additional 
hours if the mission priority justifies the risk of fatigue.  The pilot in command (PIC) is 
authorized this authority if circumstances arise that prohibit the ability to contact the 
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regular approval authority.  This is a necessary delegation of authority due to the nature 
of military operations in which aircrew often operate under electronic emissions 
restrictions or outside of communication reception ranges. 
 
 
Table 2. United States Air Force Flight Duty Period Time Regulations 
In summary, there are strong similarities among the FAA, Navy, and Air Force 
regulations regarding aviation crew rest and length of crew day.  While there are subtle 
differences in wording and structure that reflect the different nature of operations among 
the organizations, the underlying theme is a detailed framework of guidelines set forth to 
govern the flight scheduling process and enhance safety in operations.  These instructions 
acknowledge the importance of mitigating fatigue and its physiological effects on human 
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performance. While they do not directly instruct schedulers and aviators on how best to 
mitigate these risks in flight scheduling, they leave a design opportunity for aviators, 
schedulers, and researchers to develop their own scheduling methods to best balance the 
operational needs of the organization with the physiological needs of the operators. 
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AVIATION FATIGUE MANAGEMENT 
MODELS AND SOFTWARE 
Over the past four decades, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has been 
heavily involved in the research and development of fatigue management models.  This 
section of the chapter reviews the chronological evolution of fatigue research and the 
major models developed in DoD.  It also provides an overview of the capabilities and 
limitations of different software applications developed to manage and assess fatigue in 
flight scheduling.   
1. Sleep Performance Model 
In the early 1980s, the Department of Defense (DoD) funded joint research 
between Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) and Scientific Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC) to investigate the relationship between sleep levels and 
effectiveness with regard to artillery ordnance employment.  WRAIR later augmented 
these studies by conducting a major study in the 1990s that used wrist-worn activity 
monitors or actigraphs.  These wrist-worn actigraphs, originally called Sleep and Activity 
Monitors (SAM), allowed researchers to collect activity and estimation of sleep on 66 
subjects over the course of one week.  They provided the means to compare real-time 
assessment of cognitive performance based on sleep patterns.  The subjects were 
permitted normal sleep, partial sleep deprivation, or total sleep deprivation and performed 
psychomotor vigilance tasks under these three conditions.  This sleep dose-response 
(SDR) study provided data used to formulate numerical estimations of parameters, which 
became the foundation of the Sleep Performance Model (SPM).  It also clarified several 
sleep-related performance measures that became baselines in further model and software 
development. 
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The SPM takes an individual's retrospective sleep data to produce an estimate of 
current predicted effectiveness.  The estimation can be applied to a specific individual or 
unit of operation.  The feedback provided by the SPM can be used to identify when an 
individual needs more sleep, or substituting crewmembers, to mitigate the risk of fatigue.  
It can even be applied on a macro level by providing a weighting function representing 
the effects of fatigue on larger scale operations. 
2. Sleep, Activity, Fatigue, and Task Effectiveness Model 
After the development of SPM, further research was conducted by the U.S. Air 
Force Research Laboratory (AFRL).  The Warfighter Fatigue Countermeasures (WFC) 
Program of the AFRL supported Dr. Steven Hursh in efforts to develop the Sleep, 
Activity, Fatigue, and Task Effectiveness (SAFTE) Model.  This model is based on sleep 
and circadian rhythm research conducted over many years.  It was designed to consider a 
wide range of schedule and sleep conditions over any time period and produce valid 
performance predictions.  Additionally, the circadian data were on subjects ranging from 
ages ranging from twenty to the mid-fifties to accurately model the demographics of the 
majority of operators.  
SAFTE models how the human circadian process affects both sleep regulation 
and performance.  In the model, sleep regulation entails hours of sleep and awake, current 
sleep debt, sleep fragmentation, and the circadian process.  All of these factors influence 
quality of sleep.  Performance encompasses the current balance of sleep regulation, sleep 
inertia, and the circadian process.  This homeostatic model takes data inputs of recent 
sleep history and creates predictions of future performance of an individual or group.  
SAFTE was also developed to easily be amended to incorporate fatigue effects that 
specific to different operator communities.  This allowed widespread operational usage in 
the scheduling of operations ranging from the railroad industry to military aviation. 
While this model was an advancement of the SPM, it also has shortcomings that 
had to be addressed before usage.  The severity of the shortfalls depends of the specific 
application.  The first limitation is that the model does not directly address individual 
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parameters such as age, time of day, or sleep requirements for maximum performance 
effectiveness.  Additionally, it does not provide any form of group variance estimations 
about the average performance prediction.  Essentially, these limitations may not affect 
large group scheduling or generic schedules.  However, they have potentially 
consequential effects when dealing with individual performances.  The DoD 
acknowledged these shortcomings and funded research for further development. 
 
Figure 1.  SAFTE Model Schematic (Hursh, 2003) 
The Air Force awarded a contract to NTI, Inc. and Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC) to develop a software application of the fatigue 
modeling research under a Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grant.  The end 
product was the Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST). 
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3. Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool 
The objective of creating FAST was to apply the SAFTE Model in a computer-
based tool for operational planning and scheduling.   The user is afforded graphical 
output and quantitative estimates to evaluate and compare predicted effectiveness in 
alternative scheduling scenarios, a function of fatigue and circadian variation as 
calculated by the SAFTE Model. 
FAST is an interactive tool that relies heavily on user inputs.  It provides 
predicted effectiveness estimates based on user-defined sleep/wake schedules.  The user 
can select a desired time period ranging from six hours to 30 days to view the fatigue 
effect on a proposed schedule.  FAST generates a graphical display of performance 
effectiveness over the desired period of time.  In addition to the graph curve, the software 
also includes interpretation tools to aid the user.  The familiar Windows menu structure 
allows a dashboard feature to be enabled.  The fatigue indicator dashboard is a movable 
window that corresponds to a single point in time along the curve of the graphical 
performance estimate.  The dashboard was designed to provide the user a detailed 
snapshot of the predicted effectiveness at a given time.  The dashboard provides detailed 
statistics to aid scheduling of critical events.  The output is divided into two major 
categories of performance and fatigue factors.  The performance category is further 
divided into sub-categories of effectiveness, mean cognitive, lapse index, reaction time, 
and reservoir.  The fatigue factors category entails sub-categories of sleep (amount of 
sleep within last 24 hours), chronic sleep debt, hours awake, time of day, and circadian 
phase de-synchrony.  Finally, the top display of the dashboard has these fatigue factors 
listed with red flags next to any sub-category that is negatively affecting the overall 
performance effectiveness.  The driving force behind the implementation of this feature 
was to aid in the analysis of factors that cause decreased predicted performance. 
Other features of FAST are the color-coded graphical background and vertical 
axis display options.  The graphical output is colored to enhance the ability to visualize 
degradation.  The upper portion (greater than 90% effectiveness) of the graph is shaded 
green to represent a safe zone.  The middle portion (between <90% and 65% 
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effectiveness) is shaded yellow to represent a caution zone.  Finally, the bottom portion 
(<65% effectiveness) is shaded red to depict a danger zone.  This familiar color scheme 
aids the user in deciding which portions of the schedule need further analysis.  The right-
hand vertical axis display compliments this feature by allowing the user to select criteria 
such as blood alcohol content (BAC) equivalence, lapse index (likelihood of attention 
lapse due to microsleep), sleep reservoir, and acrophase (time at which the peak of the 
circadian rhythm occurs) as an overlay on the graph.  This provides the user a quick and 
simple indication of the severity of degradation in predicted effectiveness. 
There are assumptions and limitations incorporated into FAST.  FAST requires 
the user to input past and future schedule times.  It accounts for time as either on-duty, 
sleeping, or awake and off-duty.  The program allows the user to rate the quality of sleep 
using four descriptive levels; excellent, good, fair, and poor, that directly correlate to 
performance effectiveness.  This level of detail is essential in accurate fatigue modeling 
in harsh sleeping environments such as aboard naval vessels.  Factors such as machinery 
noise and excess movement from heavy seas can have varying effects on sleep in 
individuals.  However, FAST contains no method to factor the effects of fatigue 
countermeasures such as sleep aids and alerting drugs such as caffeine, which may play a 
significant role in sleep quality.  The most significant limitation to this software is the 
time required to use it.  FAST is very detailed and gives the user a high level of feedback, 
but is costly in terms of time resources.  This factor was the leading cause for movement 
toward developing a software application that encompassed the key benefits of FAST but 
focused on ease of use seen in FlyAwake.  The FlyAwake effort focused on the 
production of fatigue assessment software that is easy to use and immediately deployable 
to the military units at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 
4. FlyAwake 
While FAST effectively applied the SAFTE algorithm in scheduling, it has been 
limited because of usable issues.  It has been helpful in safety investigations and research, 
but its complex user interface has prevented it from being integrated into operational 
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squadrons.  However, after two significant fatigue related mishaps in 2007, the Air 
National Guard (ANG) 201st Airlift Squadron began using FAST to model aircrew 
fatigue in their flight schedules. After six months of FAST utilization, Lt. Col. Edward 
Vaughn, of the USAF Air National Guard Safety Center, obtained funding from the 
Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC) of the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) in order to contract development of an improved software program.  The objective 
was to develop a web-based software program based on the SAFTE algorithm with a 
graphical user interface (GUI) that reduced workload requirements for schedulers and 
was deployable at the squadron level. 
The Air National Guard and MacroSystems, Inc. began developing FlyAwake in 
late 2007.  Air National Guard pilots from 20 wings were recruited to assist in the 
software development by providing user feedback in order to tailor the product 
specifically to scheduler needs.  A major burden identified by FAST critics was data 
entry into the software program.  In order to alleviate this burden, FlyAwake was 
developed with pre-populated data specific to a squadron's Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) 
aircraft such as missions and duties.  This improved graphical user interface (GUI) 
significantly decreases laborious typing of data by schedulers and aircrew.  It also has 
default settings for mission brief, launch, recovery, and debrief times in order to further 
reduce the workload.  However, the user has the ability to customize the schedule as 
necessary to input an accurate depiction of a work cycle or flight schedule.  FlyAwake 
takes the user inputs and performs a fatigue algorithm that accounts for the duty cycle 
and sleep history of an aircrew, and provides an accurate assessment of overall fatigue 
levels. 
FlyAwake steadily gained support in the aviation safety community as a result of 
its success in fatigue modeling and assessment.  Specifically, the U.S. Air Force Patriot 
Excalibur (PEX) program and the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Tactical Airlift Control 
Center (TACC) were interested in incorporating FlyAwake into their scheduling 
processes.  As a result, the DSOC again funded the ANG, which contracted with 
MacroSystems to create a second version with the ability to communicate with other 
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software scheduling programs.  FlyAwake v2.0 was released during the summer of 2009 
and can now be integrated into existing flight scheduling.  This capability provides the 
user with fatigue mitigation recommendations to provide flight-scheduling optimization 
for fatigue management. 
The DSOC encouraged the software developers of FlyAwake to make it into a 
joint military application.  In effort to support this requirement, the second contract with 
MacroSystems also included the incorporation of FlyAwake with the Joint Air Logistics 
Information System (JALIS).  JALIS is multi-service coordinated air logistics scheduling 
program and decision support tool servicing Operational Support Airlift Agency (OSAA) 
and Navy Unique Fleet Essential Aircraft (NUFEA).  However, due to compatibility 
issues and contract time constraints, the decision was made to replace the JALIS 
requirement with the U.S. Navy Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (SHARP).  
This modification allows the immediate incorporation of FlyAwake into a large aviation 
community of software users and may ultimately enhance safety in Naval Aviation. 
Innova Systems, the software development company of SHARP, is currently 
working with MacroSystems under the guidance of Commander, Naval Air Forces 
(CNAF) to produce a version of SHARP with the built-in functionality of FlyAwake for 
the October 2009 version release.  This version will be available for designated squadrons 
for usability testing in the fleet.   Further dissemination of SHARP versions with 
FlyAwake integrated capabilities will depend on the CNAF evaluation of the feedback 














The objective of this thesis is to conduct a comparative analysis of U.S. Navy 
flight schedules using current baseline fatigue-related scheduling against flight 
scheduling that uses FlyAwake software.  Retrospective flight schedules were analyzed 
for aircrew fatigue levels using FlyAwake and then compared against alternative 
scheduling options with the aid of FlyAwake.  Section B describes the method for the 
aircrew data collection and the selection process.  Section C covers the data input 
procedures and data output that processes the flight scheduling data through FlyAwake.  
Finally, Section D describes the analytical strategy employed during the flight schedule 
comparison.  
B. AIRCREW DATA COLLECTION 
The retrospective aircrew data were obtained from the SHARP database of 
Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron Light Four Two (HSL-42).  Permissions and 
administrative rights were granted by Innova Systems for full access to all functions of 
SHARP within the HSL-42 squadron.  Previously completed and executed flight 
schedules, scheduled ground events, special scheduling requests (referred to by aircrew 
as “snivels”), aircrew qualifications, pilot logbooks, and currency reports were all 
exported from SHARP into Excel spreadsheets for analysis. 
After the access to SHARP data was granted, the process of selecting an 
appropriate date range for the analysis of data was necessary.  The process of transferring 
data between SHARP and FlyAwake required extensive manual user input at this stage of 
development of the analysis.  This limitation led to the selection of one month as an 
appropriate time frame for the analysis.  February 2008 was selected for several reasons.   
to.  It had a standard operations tempo (OPTEMPO), was sufficiently past the holiday 
season to minimize the number of aircrew on vacation.  In addition, it was mid-quarter so 
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the operations department usually has a solid projection of flight hours remaining in the 
second quarter, and it was a month that is generally associated with detachment underway 
and deployment cycles. 
The final challenge in the selection process was the isolation of a specific group 
of aircrew for analysis.  February 2008 had two separate detachments with underway 
periods, which conducted workups for their upcoming deployments.  These detachments 
were chosen in order to provide a glimpse into the benefits that FlyAwake affords while 
flight scheduling at homeguard with a large pool of pilots versus underway scheduling 
with a limited pool of only five (in the case of this analysis)  which limits the options for 
a detachment operations officer.  Additionally, the selection of detachment pilots 
conducting operations underway bounded the analysis by significantly reducing the flight 
scheduling variability that is present when analyzing schedules of an entire squadron.  
The detachments embarked on their respective ships and only had scheduling access to 
their five assigned pilots.  This restriction assisted in the analysis by limiting certain 
aircrew dynamics that cannot be captured by a software database.  Flight scheduling 
events and time frames are always approved and/or assigned by higher authority and 
disseminated through the Air Tasking Order (ATO), translating into reduced freedom and 
ability for detachments to build their own flight schedules.  While the homeguard 
operations department also has some mandated time commitments to honor, overall they 
usually have much more freedom and flexibility in their flight schedules.  In summary, 
February 2008 provided the ability to sufficient bound the analysis in order to provide a 
realistic and valid approach to conducting this comparison. 
C. PROCEDURES 
The first procedure following the completion of the collection and selection of the 
aircrew data set was filtering the data to extract only the desired aircrew members.  The 
data set was contained in Excel spreadsheets and was filtered and organized 
chronologically for ease of processing through FlyAwake.  An example of the data set is 
provided in Figure 2 with aircrew names removed. 
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Figure 2.  Excel Spreadsheet Containing Detachment Executed Flights 
Logged flights for each pilot were processed through FlyAwake in order to 
calculate the predicted effectiveness.  Access to FlyAwake is via the internet and the 
initial screen prompts the user to select the aircraft specific to the analysis.  For the 
purposes of this study, the F-15 was selected because there was not a functional 
helicopter option in FlyAwake at the time of analysis.  The selection of the F-15 option 
was primarily for ease of data input.  The aircraft selection does not affect the fatigue 
algorithm, but only changes the preset options that are specific to each aviation 
community such as standard flight scheduling time frames, mission types, and number of 
aircrew.  This study focused only on the scheduling of pilots, which was a similar setup 
as the F-15 option.  Additionally, the F-15 option contained both FAM (Familiarization) 
and FCF (Functional Check Flight) flight options, which were appropriately complex for 
the current analysis.  The type or difficulty of the flight event selected in this procedure 
also had no effect on the algorithm.  Sample screenshots of the user interface are 
provided in Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5. 
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Figure 3.  FlyAwake Aircraft Selection Screenshot 
 




Figure 5.  FlyAwake Work Schedule Builder Screenshot 
After the aircrew data set was input, FlyAwake generated a graphical display of 
the predicted effectiveness over time for each pilot.  An example of this output is 
provided in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  FlyAwake Graphical Output Screenshot 
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The graph in Figure 6 displays the predicted effectiveness on the y-axis with 
respect to time on the x-axis.  It also provides overlays of day and night time, periods of 
work and sleep, and the safe zone versus the fatigue risk zone to visually aid the user.  
Every graphical display has a horizontal dashed line, which indicates the 77.5% predicted 
effectiveness threshold.  This threshold is currently used by the Air National Guard 
(ANG) as the minimum level of acceptable in-flight predicted effectiveness when 
scheduling flight operations.  This threshold also served as the baseline for scheduling 
recommendations or changes in the analytical strategy of this study. 
FlyAwake also gives the user an option to export the row data from the graphical 
display shown previously in Figure 6.  An example of the raw FlyAwake data export is 
provided in Figure 7.  The data set is exported from FlyAwake in vertical columns 
representing zulu time, local time, schedule type (None, Sleep, or Work), and predicted 
effectiveness percentage.  These data exports were saved as a .txt files and later imported 
into Excel spreadsheets for statistical analysis.   
 
Figure 7.  FlyAwake Data Export Screenshot 
After the data set was imported and saved as an Excel spreadsheet, it required 
filtering for analysis.  This study focused only the predicted effectiveness percentages of 
the pilots when they were executing a scheduled flight.  In this study, work was defined 
as a combination of the preflight, in-flight, and post-flight duties associated with flight 
operations.  Each flight was assigned a value of 120 minutes for preflight duties to 
account for time in briefs, planning, weather analysis, aircraft inspection, and all aircraft 
ground preparations executed before takeoff.  Post-flight was assigned a value of 60 
minutes to capture duties such as engine waterwash, completion of Maintenance Action 
Forms (MAF), logging the flight details into SHARP, and debriefs.  Any time that a pilot 
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was either at the squadron or on the ship in a non-flying capacity was included in the 
analysis of predicted effectiveness in this study.  However, it was considered as a 
contributing factor to overall fatigue levels and subsequently inputted into the FlyAwake 
schedule builder module.  This required considerable attention to detail and a manual 
comparison of data to logbooks to ensure that only flights that were actually executed 
remained in the spreadsheets that were used for analysis. 
The predicted effectiveness percentages were then color-coded into four 
categories, highlighted accordingly, and used in the later analysis.  An example of this is 
depicted in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.  FlyAwake Data Imported into Excel Spreadsheet 
The predicted effectiveness ranges were represented by the colors green, yellow, red, and 
black.  Green represents predicted effectiveness above 82.5%, yellow represents 
predicted effectiveness calculations equal to or less than 82.5% but above 80.0%, red 
represents calculations equal or less than 80.0% but above 77.5%, and black represents 
calculations equal of less than 77.5%.  Table 3, Categories of Predicted Effectiveness 




Table 3. Categories of Predicted Effectiveness Ranges 
The final procedure in this study was to statistically test whether the predicted 
effectiveness percentages calculated by FlyAwake aids a squadron operations department 
when constructing a flight schedule.  A baseline condition was required in order to 
conduct a statistical comparison.  The descriptive statistics tool available in Excel was 
utilized to calculate the mean, maximum, minimum, and range of predicted effectiveness 
percentages for each pilot and detachment.  Additional data, including the number of 
occurrences and percentage of time in each category, were also collected for each pilot 
and detachment.  These metrics served as a baseline measurement of effectiveness for 
this study.  Identical procedures were followed when changes were incorporated to reflect 
the changes identified by FlyAwake.  The analytical strategy employed in order to 
feasibly incorporate this knowledge is discussed in Section D. 
D. ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
The analytical strategy of this study was intentionally conservative.  The overall 
objective was to preserve the validity of the analysis by incorporating changes that 
minimized alterations to the previously executed flight schedules.  Specifically, this 
prohibited altering any takeoff or landing times.  This eliminated the option of shifting 
takeoff and landing times in order to minimize pilot exposure to reduced predicted 
effectiveness calculations.  The basis of this analytical restriction is due to the often rigid 
nature of flight scheduling when conducting shipboard operations.  This is a reality with 
which every squadron operations officer is familiar. 
The threshold represented by the black category (i.e., less than or equal to 77.5% 
predicted effectiveness) served as the baseline for flight schedule change consideration.  
As mentioned in Section C, this is the current scheduling baseline for the 201st ANG.  
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Any occurrence in this category served as a highlighted event for analysis.  Each 
occurrence in the black was either assigned a recommendation for action or an alternate 
crew composition.  All considerations of an operations officer were simulated.  These 
include pilot qualifications, currency requirements, crew day, crew rest, duty schedules, 
ground events, medical status, and snivels when implementing a crew change.  A 
recommendation for action was issued whenever a crew change was deemed unfeasible.  
These recommendations included exercising extra vigilance, naps, and the substitution of 
rested pilots for engine waterwash and aircraft traversing during post-flight duties.  
Chapter IV contains a detailed discussion of the results of this analysis. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to present and summarize the results produced from 
the methods discussed in Chapter III.  An overview is presented in Section A and the 
results for the helicopter air detachments embarked on USS BOONE (FFG-28) are 
covered in Section B, with results for USS KAUFFMAN (FFG-59) in Section C.   
A. OVERVIEW 
This section provides an overview of the historical flight profiles for both USN 
aviation detachments.  This information illustrates the portion of the flight duty period 
(FDP) which was used in the current study.  The total SHARP data set from February 
2008 contained 192.2 flight hours, which translated into 498.2 cumulative hours of 
individual pilot FDP.  These data were exported from SHARP into Excel, manually input 
into FlyAwake, and then exported from FlyAwake into Excel for analysis. This 
information was exported in one-minute increments (29,892 separate observations) by 
FlyAwake (Shown in Figure 8).  Of these 29,892 rows of aircrew data, only a small 
portion was identified by FlyAwake as potentially high risk to the aircrew.  This pays 
tribute to over four decades worth of safety research that focused on crew day and crew 
rest and the effectiveness of current USN aircrew scheduling practices.  These regulations 
are discussed in Chapter II. 
Figures 9, 10, and 11 display the actual percentages of preflight, in-flight, and 
post-flight times identified by FlyAwake for each fatigue category during February 2008.   
As displayed in Table 3 (located in Chapter III), the green category refers to predicted 
effectiveness ranges greater than 82.5%, the yellow category is the interval 80.0% to 
82.5%, the red category is the interval 77.5% to 80.0%, and the black category is less 
than or equal to 77.5%.  As seen in these figures, only a small percentage of time actually 
falls in the critical black category.  During the preflight phase, 100% of the pilots fell into 
the green category (that is, FlyAwake did not identify any instances where pilots were 
vulnerable to fatigue).  Less than one percent (0.93%) of the in-flight duty time fell in the 
 36
black category.  While this is a small percentage of the total flight profile, this equates to 
1.79 hours of flight time, which is a considerable length of time for fatigued pilots who 
are controlling an aircraft.  Nearly 20% (19.4%) of the post-flight phase falls into the 
black or “danger” category.  These occurrences in the post-flight phase are the focus of 
the current analysis.  Sections B and C contain detailed discussions of these results, but 
the significant increase of time in the black category during the post-flight phase can be 
attributed to night flights and multiple missions. 
These figures illustrate that the current scheduling regulations are quite effective.  
However, FlyAwake is a decision support tool designed to highlight those aircrew at high 
risk of fatigue during their FDP.  The OPTEMPO of the operations department is usually 
high and the availability of a decision support tool to automatically aid scheduler 
identification of fatigued aircrew is a tremendous asset. 
 
 




Figure 10.  Percentage of Total In-flight Time by Fatigue Category 
 
Figure 11.  Percentage of Total Post-Flight Time by Fatigue Category 
B. USS BOONE (FFG-28) AIR DETACHMENT 
The first detachment analyzed was embarked on the frigate, USS BOONE, for the 
majority of flights logged in February 2008.  The pilots logged 62.2 (70.4%) of their 88.3 
February 2008 flight hours while embarked on BOONE.  The detachment was assigned 
one SH-60B helicopter and five pilots to support air operations onboard the frigate during 
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this pre-deployment workup cycle.  There were also aircrewmen and aviation 
maintenance personnel attached to the detachment, but these individuals were omitted 
from the analysis.  The following paragraphs discuss the results.   
FlyAwake indentified five of the 33 flights logged by the detachment as having 
one or more pilots in the black category at some portion of their work period.  Of the five 
flights, only two flights were considered feasible candidates for schedule changes.  Both 
changes consisted of eliminating prolonged night flights by altering crew composition.  
Specifically, the pilots who were highlighted in the black category had been scheduled 
for two consecutive flights (referred to as a “double bag”) in which at least one flight was 
completely at night.  In this case, using alternative crew compositions for night flight 
operations reduced the exposure of the pilots in the black category (predicted 
effectiveness ≤ 77.5%).  The results are displayed in Table 4 and are further analyzed in 
the following sections. 
 
Table 4. Overview of FFG-28 Detachment Changes 
The categorical data analysis measured the scheduling effectiveness after 
implementing FlyAwake by calculating the percentages of time exposure per category, 
the number of occurrences per category, and the distribution by phase of flight for 
occurrences in the black category.  The percentages of time in each predicted 
effectiveness category are displayed in Table 5 and graphically in Figure 12.  The results 
showed increased percentages of time in both green and yellow categories and 
corresponding decreases in red and black categories.  Most significant were the 4.15% 
and 5.01% relative decreases of time spent in red and black categories. 
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Table 5. FFG-28 Detachment Percentages of Flight Duty Period in Category 
 
Figure 12.  FFG-28 Detachment Percentage of Total Schedule Flight Duty Time 
Below Green Category 
The next measure of effectiveness (MOE) was a tally of the total number of 
categorical occurrences per pilot.  It was imperative to calculate this MOE with respect to 
each detachment pilot instead of each logged flight due to differences in flight scheduling 
at the homeguard squadron compared to shipboard operations.  The detachment pilots are 
able to fly with any qualified pilot while at homeguard while they are restricted to only 
other detachment pilots while embarked.  This explains the ambiguity between 33 total 
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flights listed in Table 4 and 56 occurrences in the green category listed in Table 6 and 
Figure 13.  The results showed no increase in occurrences in any category and a 12.50% 
decrease in the black category.  The reduction of pilot occurrences in the black category 
resulted from a crew composition change. 
 
Table 6. FFG-28 Total Number of Occurrences by Fatigue Category 
 
Figure 13.  FFG-28 Detachment Comparative Histogram of the Number of Flights 
with at least One Occurrence in Fatigue Category 
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The study categorically divided each flight into preflight, in-flight, and post-flight 
phases in order to determine the specific timing of all eight occurrences in the black 
category before and after implementing scheduling changes.  The results showed a 25.0% 
decrease of in-flight occurrences in the black fatigue category and a 12.5% decrease of 
post-flight occurrences in the black category.  These results are displayed in Table 7 and 
in Figure 14. 
 
 







Figure 14.  FFG-28 Detachment Breakdown of Flights with Occurrences in Black 
Category 
C. USS KAUFFMAN (FFG-59) AIR DETACHMENT 
The second detachment that was analyzed was embarked on the frigate, USS 
KAUFFMAN, for the majority of the flights it logged in February 2008.  The pilots 
logged 76.4 (73.5%) of their 103.9 February 2008 flight hours while embarked on 
KAUFFMAN.  The detachment was assigned one SH-60B helicopter and five pilots to 
support air operations onboard the frigate during this pre-deployment workup cycle.  
There were also aircrewmen and aviation maintenance personnel attached to the 
detachment, but these individuals were omitted from this analysis.  The following 
paragraphs discuss the results.   
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FlyAwake indentified four of the 38 logged flights by the detachment as having 
one or more pilots highlighted in the black category at some portion of the FDP.  Of the 
four flights highlighted, only two flights were considered reasonable candidates for 
schedule changes.  Similar to the USS BOONE Air Detachment, both changes consisted 
of eliminating prolonged night flights by altering crew composition.  The results are 
displayed in Table 8 and are further analyzed in the following sections. 
 
Table 8. Overview of FFG-59 Detachment Changes 
The categorical data analysis measured the scheduling effectiveness after 
implementing FlyAwake by calculating the percentages of time exposure per category, 
the number of occurrences per category, and the distribution by phase of flight for 
occurrences in the black category.  The percentages of time in each predicted 
effectiveness category are displayed in Table 9 and graphically in Figure 15.  The results 
showed slight increased percentages of time in the green category and corresponding 
decreases in the yellow, red, and black categories.  Most significant were the 14.53% and 
20.00% relative decrease in time spent in red and black categories. 
 
Table 9. FFG-59 Detachment Percentages of Flight Duty Period in Category 
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Figure 15.  FFG-59 Detachment Percentage of Total Schedule Flight Duty Time 
Below Green Category 
The next measure of effectiveness (MOE) was a tally of the total number of 
categorical occurrences per pilot.  This MOE was calculated with respect to each 
detachment pilot, instead of with each logged flight, due to differences in flight 
scheduling at the homeguard squadron compared to shipboard operations.  The 
detachment pilots are able to fly with any qualified pilot while at homeguard while they 
are restricted to only these detachment pilots while embarked.  This explains the 
ambiguity between the difference of 38 total flights listed in Table 8 and 67 occurrences 
in the green category listed in Table 10 and Figure 16.  The results showed no increase in 
occurrences in any category and a 16.67% decrease in the black category.  The reduction 
of pilot occurrences in the black category resulted from a crew composition change. 
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Table 10. FFG-59 Total Number of Occurrences by Fatigue Category 
 
Figure 16.  FFG-59 Detachment Comparative Histogram of the Number of Flights 
With At Least One Occurrence in Fatigue Category 
Each flight was divided into preflight, in-flight, and post-flight segments in order 
to determine the specific timing of all eight occurrences in the black category both before 
and after implementing schedule changes.  The results showed a 16.7% decrease of post-
flight occurrences in the black category and are displayed in Table 11 and in Figure 17. 
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Table 11. FFG-59 Detachment Flight Phase Distribution of Occurrences in Black 
Category 
 
Figure 17.  FFG-59 Detachment Breakdown of Occurrences in Black Category 
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V. ADDITIONAL THESIS EFFORTS 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the non-quantitative portion of this 
research.  This original intent of this thesis was to program the SAFTE algorithm using 
Microsoft Visual Basic (VB) in order to process SHARP generated flight schedules for 
fatigue modeling assessments.  The idea was that a scheduler could then analyze the 
algorithm’s assessment and make changes where feasible.  However, during the 
conceptual development planning of this model, it was discovered that achieving this 
method of assessment would result in a significant increase in workload for personnel in 
the Operations Department.  This defied one of the original objectives of minimizing 
additional work for the flight schedulers in the Operations Departments.  However, 
during the thesis research, we discovered that the ANG 201st had received funding for the 
development of a fatigue modeling software program, FlyAwake. 
After learning that the ANG 201st was using FlyAwake, we contacted them to 
discuss the algorithm, software usability, and squadron scheduling procedures.  Capt. 
Lynn Lee from the 201st ANG Wing offered the opportunity to merge FlyAwake, owned 
by MacroSystems, with the U.S. Navy’s SHARP along with ongoing integrations with 
other DoD aviation scheduling software programs.  Capt. Lee generated a contract 
modification and added SHARP, owned by Innova Systems, to the list of software 
available for integration. 
This contract modification changed both the theme and scope of the thesis 
research.  The thesis was no longer the development of a fatigue modeling scheduling 
tool, but instead involved conducting a proof of concept analysis for validation purposes 
of the integration of fatigue modeling into SHARP.  This change of direction also 
translated into a change in roles and responsibilities for this thesis.  In conjunction with 
formulating a method to conduct a proof of concept analysis, there were liaison 
responsibilities to coordinate the efforts between Innova Systems, MacroSystems, and 
CNAF.  The coordination began with obtaining the necessary permissions to advance 
these efforts from CNAF and then engaging directly with the program managers and 
 48
design teams of the two companies.  After the Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) was 
obtained, teleconferences were routinely held in order to discuss the design specifications 
of this integration. 
Currently, the FlyAwake technical lead is working to meet a September 2009 
deadline set by Innova Systems in order to have a beta version of SHARP with the 
FlyAwake algorithm inside the Scheduler Module.  CNAF is in the process of 
determining the specific squadrons designated for providing operational feedback from 
the Fleet.  In conjunction with the Fleet squadron selections, four Fleet Logistics Support 
Squadrons (VR) squadrons have volunteered to assist in usability studies to provide this 
feedback.  Pending the results of the squadron feedback, the FlyAwake fatigue-modeling 
algorithm may be a Fleet-wide application as early as the spring 2010 release of SHARP. 
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VI. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. DISCUSSION 
The objective of this study was to conduct a proof of concept to determine 
whether the integration of the FlyAwake fatigue-modeling algorithm within the SHARP 
scheduler module would benefit naval aviation.  The results of the thesis determined that 
FlyAwake improved the predicted effectiveness of flight schedules and reduced the 
number of pilot occurrences below the fatigue threshold designed as critical. 
The analysis illustrated the advantages of applying FlyAwake during critical 
phases of flight.  The results showed enhanced predicted effectiveness with regard to all 
three MOEs.  The USS BOONE (FFG-28) Detachment experienced a 4.15% 
improvement of the percentage of time spent in the red category and a 5.01% 
improvement in the black category.  The detachment also reduced its total number of 
occurrences in the black category by 12.5%.  Finally, they experienced a 25.0% reduction 
of in-flight occurrences and a 12.5% reduction of post-flight occurrences in the black 
category.   
The USS KAUFFMAN (FFG-59) Detachment experienced a 5.61% improvement 
of the percentage of time spent in the yellow, a 14.53% improvement in the red category, 
and a 20.00% improvement in the black category.  The detachment also reduced its total 
number of occurrences in the black category by 16.7% while experiencing 16.7% 
reduction of post-flight occurrences in the black category.  Overall, the results 
consistently showed improved predicted effectiveness after the implementation of flight 
schedule changes highlighted by FlyAwake.  
Both detachments showed an overall improvement in predicted effectiveness 
following the implementation of crew composition changes after fatigue related 
vulnerabilities were identified by FlyAwake.  The descriptive statistics did not reflect 
added value of the information provided by FlyAwake due to the overall small exposure 
time (less than 1.00% of total flight duty period) in the black category.  This was 
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identified in Section A and resulted in the study focusing on the occurrences in the black 
category during in-flight and post-flight segments. The results showed that the mean 
remained fairly constant in both the FFG-28 and FFG-59 detachments with an increase of 
0.77% and a decrease of 0.003%, respectively.  This was attributed to the method of 
generating these calculations and the statistical ability of the mean to dampen small 
variability.   
A relaxation of the procedural constraints would have generated drastically 
different results by increasing the minimum, decreasing the range, and improving the 
categorical analysis.  If schedules could shift those “at risk” night flights identified by 
FlyAwake so that takeoff and landing times were 30 minutes earlier, there would have 
been an overall 35.7% reduction of occurrences below the critical threshold (<77.5% 
predicted effectiveness).  Allowing schedule times to be adjusted up to 60 minutes would 
further reduce occurrences in the black category to 50.0% and completely eliminate any 
in-flight occurrences of the high risk category. 
The United States Navy implements good flight scheduling regulations consistent 
with other military branches and civilian aviation.  These policies, which were created 
from decades of expertise and research, drive current flight scheduling procedures.  This 
thesis addressed the ability of the FlyAwake algorithm to identify pilots at high risk of 
fatigue using historical Navy flight schedules.  From the small percentage of flights 
identified by FlyAwake as “high risk,” the conservative approach of this analysis (i.e., 
considering only crew composition changes for pilots identified by FlyAwake as “high 
risk”) inhibited the ability to display the benefits of FlyAwake through the descriptive 
statistics.   
The categorical analysis highlighted both the strength and value of FlyAwake.  It 
reinforced pilot vulnerability to fatigue while conducting night operations, but also 
showed that exposure to these levels of fatigue can often be avoided by eliminating 
prolonged flights or multiple consecutive flights at night.  In this study, every flight that 
was highlighted in the black category occurred at night.  There were a total of four flights 
changed, and they all minimized pilot exposure from the black category by altering the 
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crew composition in order to eliminate consecutive flights at night.  The ability to swap 
crewmembers will vary depending on T/M/S aircraft of a specific aviation community; 
however, there are other scheduling options that may achieve similar results.  An 
example of this is the addition of an extra pilot in platforms such as P-3s, C-130s, or CH-
53s, which can provide resting opportunities for the other pilots. 
The results of this study suggests that Naval Aviation regulations promulgated in 
OPNAVINST 3710.7T, T/M/S NATOPS manuals, and SOPs regarding flight operations 
are very good minimizing aircrew exposure to fatigue while conducting flight operations, 
especially while conducting flight operations during daytime.  This study found only four 
(3.25% of total study) in-flight occurrences of pilots below the 77.5% predicted 
effectiveness threshold in which all were at night.  FlyAwake was able to eliminate one 
of these occurrences and reduced the total study percentage to 2.44%.  While the pre-
FlyAwake percentage of 3.25% was relatively small, one must keep in mind the SH-60B 
helicopter detachment standards reserve a 30% minimum of all allocated flight hours for 
nighttime flight operations.  Using the standard as the minimum, the detachments in this 
study experienced an in-flight occurrence below the threshold on 10.8% of their night 
flights.  Furthermore, they experienced 14 (11.4% of total study) post-flight occurrences 
of pilots below the threshold.  This is calculated as 46.67% of all night flights when using 
the 30% detachment standard.  It is evident that fatigue was present in both detachments 
while conducting night operations. 
This analysis concludes that there is room for improvement in flight scheduling 
by using fatigue modeling.  Current Naval Aviation regulations address much of the crew 
rest and crew day requirements, but the addition of aircrew fatigue modeling will further 
augment the existing procedures and regulations.  This FlyAwake augmentation will 
result in safer flight operations, since it will reduce aircrew exposure below critical 
aviation fatigue thresholds.  It is also important to note that the integration of the 
FlyAwake algorithm into SHARP does not add a significant workload to the flight 
scheduling process.  FlyAwake can provide the operations department, safety department, 
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and commanding officer an additional piece of data when constructing, reviewing, and 
approving a flight schedule while enhancing the ORM of the scheduled aircrew.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
This research provided a proof of concept to validate the integration of FlyAwake 
fatigue modeling into the SHARP Scheduler Module.  While this analysis demonstrated 
that FlyAwake improved flight schedules with regard to predicted effectiveness, actual 
implementation of FlyAwake/SHARP will still require a usability study.  This section 
provides recommendations for the usability study and references for similar studies 
conducted in the past. 
1. Squadron Usability Study 
This thesis provides a proof of concept validation to support the integration of 
FlyAwake fatigue modeling algorithm into the SHARP schedule module.  However, the 
final validation of this effort will ultimately come directly from the Fleet.  The plan has 
been for CNAF to select operational Fleet squadrons that will provide assessments of the 
operational effects of implementing FlyAwake into actual squadrons.  To accomplish this 
goal, squadron Operations Departments should specifically focus on three main areas: 
aircrew usability, impacts on flight operations, and Operation Risk Management (ORM). 
Aircrew usability feedback should focus on the time, accuracy, and mental 
workload of the aircrew personnel in the Operations Department responsible for writing 
the daily flight schedule.  The integration efforts are focused on minimizing the impacts 
on the Operations Department with respect to time.  Squadrons should also provide 
feedback addressing any increases in workload or delays in the release of the daily flight 
schedule. 
Next, the squadrons should provide feedback on the impact of FlyAwake on flight 




Naval Aviation policies.  However, it is important to determine whether potential policy 
changes deriving from the integration of FlyAwake and SHARP would significantly 
impact a squadron’s operational effectiveness. 
Finally, information regarding aircrew ORM is a key feedback consideration.  In 
theory, fatigue modeling should not only provide safer flight schedules, but also create 
increased fatigue awareness among the assigned aircrews.  Surveying pilots and 
aircrewmen in the participating squadrons for feedback regarding their personal fatigue 
awareness levels is an effective method of obtaining this data. 
An example of an excellent usability study can be found in a NPS thesis entitled 
Applied Warfighter Ergonomics:  A Research Method for Evaluating Military Individual 
Equipment.  CPT Koichi Takagi, USMC completed this project in September 2005 and it 
can be obtained by submitting a request to the Dudley Knox Library at NPS.  Chapter III 
of his thesis specifically addresses usability study approaches and Appendices E and F 
provide examples of surveys and usability test scenarios.  Referring to CPT Takagi’s 
thesis will provide a well-designed template for a FlyAwake usability study. 
2. Aircrew Fatigue Survey 
The recommendation for an aircrew fatigue survey will provide further validation 
for fatigue modeling.  This survey can scientifically measure the efficacy of FlyAwake 
through aircrew fatigue measurements.  LCDR Eric Deussing, a flight surgeon currently 
working on his Masters of Public Health (MPH) at the Uniformed Services University of 
the Health Sciences (USUHS), is interested in administering this type of study.  Fleet 
Logistics Support Squadrons (VR) stationed at Andrews Air Force Base (AFB) have 
volunteered to participate in this study with LCDR Deussing.  Using FlyAwake 
validation in this manner will require the approval of CNAF.  However, the combination 
of operational Fleet squadron feedback, joined with aviation medical research, can 
provide an excellent assessment of the operational effects of fatigue modeling in naval 
flight operations. 
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3. FlyAwake Program Manager 
The final recommendation is to assign a program manager to oversee FlyAwake 
into the U.S. Navy.  There is a need for a single point of contact, preferably within 
CNAF, with the ability to coordinate future requirements, revisions, and contracting 
issues associated with FlyAwake.  This research served as a coordinating liaison between 
the commands and private companies; however, upon the completion of this NPS thesis, 
there will no longer be a designated Navy point of contact to coordinate and oversee the 
final stages of integration and initial rollout for Fleet usability testing.  It is my 




APPENDIX A. SUPPLEMENTAL STATISTICS 
A. USS BOONE AIR DETACHMENT 
The first step in the analysis was to conduct basic descriptive statistics.  The 
mean, minimum, maximum, and range of the predicted effectiveness provided by 
FlyAwake were calculated in order to determine the adjusted values of FlyAwake 
following schedule changes.  Table 4 provides a comparison of detachment statistics 
before and after implementing FlyAwake-based schedule changes.  The results show that 
the minimum, maximum, and range of predicted effectiveness all remained fairly 
constant after implementing changes.  This is not surprising considering that FlyAwake 
identified less than 1.0% of flights in the black category of the total FDP during February 
2008.  The detachment minimum remained unchanged and can be explained by the nature 
of its occurrence.  The minimum occurred at the end of a night vision goggle (NVG) 
flight onboard the ship, which restricted the ability to implement a schedule change.  
Additionally, there were no alternative crew options available to alleviate the predicted 
fatigue.  However, the minimum did occur during post-flight duties, which resulted in 
issuing an advisory to the crewmember and recommending an alternative pilot conduct 
post-flight duties, which require operating or traversing the aircraft.   
There was 0.08% increase in mean predicted effectiveness after executing the two 
feasible schedule changes.  This slight increase can be attributed to the fact that only 
15.15% of the flights identified by FlyAwake (black category) were considered 
candidates for schedule change.  Of this 15.15%, only 6.06% of the total logged flights 
were considered feasible for and experienced schedule modifications.  This limited 
exposure to schedule changes directly resulted in limited opportunities to increase the 
mean.  Not surprisingly, the statistics displayed in Table 12 showed that changes based 




Table 12. FFG-28 Detachment Descriptive Statistics Comparison 
B. USS KAUFFMAN AIR DETACHMENT 
The first step of the analysis was to conduct basic descriptive statistics identical to 
those discussed above regarding the FFG-28 Detachment.  The mean, minimum, 
maximum, and range of the predicted effectiveness provided by FlyAwake were 
calculated in order to determine the adjusted values of schedule changes following 
FlyAwake.  Table 13 provides a comparison of detachment statistics before and after 
implementing FlyAwake-based schedule changes.  The results show that the minimum, 
maximum, and range all remained fairly constant after implementing changes.  This is 
not surprising considering that FlyAwake identified less than 1.00% of the total FDP in 
the black category during February 2008.  Similar to the previously discussed 
detachment, the minimum remained unchanged and can be explained by the nature of its 
occurrence.  The minimum occurred at the end of a night vision goggle (NVG) flight 
while conducting shipboard operations, which restricted the ability to implement a 
schedule change.  Additionally, there were no alternative crew options available to 
alleviate the predicted fatigue.  However, the minimum did not occur in-flight.  The 
occurrence was during post-flight duties, which resulted issuing an advisory to the 
crewmember and recommending an alternative pilot to conduct post-flight duties which 
require operating or traversing the aircraft.   
There was an overall 0.003% decrease of the mean predicted effectiveness after 
executing the two feasible schedule changes.  This insignificant decrease can be 
attributed to rounding errors during calculations.  Only 10.52% of the flights identified by 
FlyAwake (black category) were considered potential candidates for schedule changes 
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and of those; only 5.26% were considered feasible and subject to schedule modifications.  
These statistics displayed in Table 13 showed the overall negligible effects of FlyAwake-
based schedule changes with regard to predicted effectiveness. 
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